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The paper examines the relationship between conflict and entrepreneurial activity in 
Afghanistan, drawing upon a unique data set, the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 
household survey 2005. Afghanistan is severely underdeveloped and poor. Conflict has 
persisted in vast swathes of the country for decades, so that Afghanistan may be more 
appropriately described as an in-, rather than post-, conflict country. 
At the same time, qualitative (and anecdotal) evidence suggests that entrepreneurial activity is 
ubiquitous, although mainly due to survival strategies rather than a spirit of entrepreneurialism…/ 
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We empirically explore whether conflict affects the likelihood of a household to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity, proxied by sources of income coming from holding a small business. 
We control for the household characteristics and those of the environment, such as social 
capital, access to resources and infrastructure, as well as the presence of a minimal institutional 
governance system, to isolate the impact of conflict on household entrepreneurial behaviour. 
We find that the direct negative effect of the conflict on entrepreneurship is very small. The 
results on the control variables suggest that (i) the generation of entrepreneurship has seen 
conflict and instability for a whole life,( ii) a small business is a mean of surviving in a situation 
where any other support is lacking, (iii) it is a viable strategy when the household can cover 
some of the associated risks, (iv) there is no indirect effect of conflict via institutions and 
infrastructure, and (v) entrepreneurial activity may substitute for lacking markets and 
governance institutions. These results call for further and more in-depth research on 
Afghanistan as an overlooked area of study by the academic and development research 
community despite representing a priority for internationally supported reconstruction. 
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Prior to the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, much of Afghanistan’s infrastructure and
state institutions had been destroyed by intent or neglect of the warring factions in the
preceding three or so decades of conﬂict. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries
in the world with an estimated per capita income of 300 US dollars, average mortality age
of 47 years, high rates of infant mortality and, in many of its provinces, void of anything
that approximates the minimum necessary formal and informal structures to serve as a
foundation for developing a severely underdeveloped economy.
By all accounts, progress to date for moving Afghanistan out of poverty and on to
a path of economic and socio-political recovery, has been arduous and slow. It has
been suggested that ongoing government and donor supported programmes and poli-
cies are likely to have more signiﬁcant and longer lasting impact if they are support-
ive of adaptive and resilient entrepreneurial activity, which is argued to be a necessary,
though not suﬃcient, condition to begin the process of reconstruction (Iyigun and Ro-
drik, 2004; UNDP, 2004; Naud´ e, 2007).
However, a suﬃciently clear picture of what the main areas of intervention might be,
is still lacking, due largely to a void of reliable empirical evidence (and analysis) on the
current state of Afghanistan in many respects. Access to appropriate data is limited
and there is a lack of in-depth reﬂection on the peculiarities of Afghanistan as compared
to other countries in the literature on economic reconstruction of in- and post-conﬂict
countries. The traditional distinction between in- and post-conﬂict or fragile state does
not seem in fact to ﬁt well in the case of Afghanistan, which is best described as a country
where conﬂict to varying degrees has persisted since the early 1980s, changing only in
intensity from time to time.
Anecdotal data have attributed the lack of entrepreneurial activity—a necessary ingre-
dient in many prescriptions for economic recovery—to the lack of security and the absence
of minimal infrastructure such as roads and electricity and weak or inappropriate institu-
tions. The same anecdotal information also points to sustained entrepreneurial activity.
A look around any major population centre or some rural areas reveals numerous cases of
innovativeness, particularly among the small-scale producers across the country, engaged
in businesses that generate value added in a wide range of activities, from dairy and poul-
try production to carpet weaving, iron mongering, auto repair and parts production, and
carpentry.
The ﬁrst aim of this work is therefore to corroborate this qualitative evidence by
analyzing the available micro dataset on households in Afghanistan, the National Risk and
Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2005. Based on this data we consider the boundaries
of entrepreneurial activity to be represented by the mere holding of a small business
as a source of income for the household, although this choice is more conservative with
respect to the traditional literature on entrepreneurialism in developed, developing, in- and
post-conﬂict countries (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2008; Casson et al., eds, 2008). Second,
1we identify the conditions under which entrepreneurial activity is more likely to exist
despite the burden of ongoing conﬂict (e.g. Baumol, 1990; Acs, 2006; Naud´ e, 2007). A
key objective in this paper is to qualify the impact of security, inadequate infrastructure
and institutional arrangements on the presence of entrepreneurial activity to identify entry
points for intervention through policy conducive to increased entrepreneurship.
We partly refer to the conceptual framework proposed by Binzel and Br¨ uck (2007)
and Justino (2009), who identify not only the direct and indirect eﬀects of conﬂict on
the households’ welfare, but also the possible types of coping strategies households might
develop as a result of conﬂict, among which is the entrepreneurial activity. Speciﬁcally,
based on the NRVA (2005) dataset, we explore the following questions:
• Are there any direct eﬀects of the ongoing conﬂict on the likelihood of households
engaging in entrepreneurial activities?
• What is the relevance of direct and indirect eﬀects of conﬂict on entrepreneurship?
• What other factors—e.g., infrastructure, social capital, access to ﬁnance, formal in-
stitutions, markets—aﬀect entrepreneurship at the household, village, and provincial
levels?
The ﬁrst, tentative picture of the micro level eﬀect of armed conﬂict on entrepreneur-
ship provided in this work should be of particular interest to the Government of Afghanistan
and the donor programmes of reconstruction since we investigate whether and how Afghani-
stan aligns to some of the consolidated evidence from developed and other developing coun-
tries and whether idiosyncratic aspects are to be emphasized in the case of Afghanistan
(UNDP, 2004; World Bank, 2005). Our analysis is intended to contribute to the micro
level evidence on armed conﬂict and its eﬀect on entrepreneurship as a basis for (better)
informed development policy making.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we articulate our working deﬁnition
of entrepreneurship and reﬂect on the extent to which deﬁnitional boundaries are to be
stretched when considering entrepreneurship in developing, in-, and post-conﬂict contexts.
We do this by selectively reviewing the literature on the impact of conﬂict on economic
activity and household welfare in general and on entrepreneurial activities in particular.
We also provide an overview of whether entrepreneurship can ease the consequences of
conﬂict and, if so, under which conditions. Section 3 highlights some of the main pecu-
liarities of the Afghan context by providing a brief historical overview of the decades long
conﬂict. Section 4 provides the details of the methodology employed. Additional material
on methodology and analysis is relegated to the technical appendix. Section 5 provides
the results of the empirical analysis while Section 6 summarizes the results to address the
key questions (above) guiding this research.
22 Entrepreneurship, economic development, and conﬂict
2.1 The “consensus” on entrepreneurship and economic development
There is a large literature on the individual characteristics of an entrepreneur, starting
from the seminal works of Schumpeter (for example Schumpeter, 1949), who regarded
the entrepreneur as a sort of heroic adventurer with a forward-looking vision. Cross-
disciplinary contributions about entrepreneurs have sparkled in other social sciences such
as psychology, anthropology and cognitive behaviour and nurtured the most recent contri-
butions on the individual characteristics and the internal cognitive processes which make
an individual an entrepreneur (Cordes, 2005; Wadeson, 2008).
According to Baumol the entrepreneur is the most elusive and yet intriguing character
in the “cast which constitute the subject of economic analysis” (p. 64 Baumol, 1968): “It
is his job to locate new ideas and to put them into eﬀect. He must lead, perhaps even
inspire; he cannot allow things to get into a rut and for him today’s practice is never good
enough for tomorrow. In short, he is the Schumpeterian innovator and some more.”
Veblen (2004) had already instilled in this elusive character an “instinct of workman-
ship”, and the ability to balance the “self-regarding” and the “other-regarding’ instincts,
resulting in group-beneﬁcial behaviour (Cordes, 2005).
For the purposes of the present work we do not focus solely on the individual charac-
teristics that determine the entrepreneurial decision to assume (economic) risks, though
the issue of risk-taking is undoubtedly of interest in understanding how to stretch and
apply the concept of entrepreneurial opportunities to developing and in-conﬂict countries
where risk is more spread and has a higher cost, such as hunger. Rather, we focus on the
resulting entrepreneurial behaviour of these individual characteristics—i.e., identifying en-
trepreneurial opportunities, starting up a new ﬁrm and, possibly, being “group-beneﬁcial”,
to use Veblen’s words—and analyze their relation with strategies to cope with risk and
lack of alternative sources of livelihood. We also focus on how the operating environment
aﬀects the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurial activities, enhancing or counteracting
the eﬀect of conﬂict.
Most of the sizeable economic literature on entrepreneurship has focused on the en-
trepreneurial history of advanced countries and the contribution of entrepreneurship to
economic growth in developed country contexts. Recent appraisals of this literature
(Acs, 2006; Audretsch et al., 2006; Boettke and Leeson, 2009; Casson et al., eds, 2008)
point to entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial ﬁrm as being a driving engine of eco-
nomic growth.1 In this respect, some scholars and a good deal of research supporting the
policy design of such entities as the United Nations, the World Bank, and a host of other
major donors and NGOs have come to conclude that entrepreneurship is a necessary con-
dition for generating economic growth and thus catching-up (UN-DESA, 2007; Hausmann
1Audretsch and Keilbach (2008) identify entrepreneurship as the creation and exploitation of the en-
semble of entrepreneurial opportunities, processes which are not necessarily the exclusive domain of large
incumbent corporations which can aﬀord to spend in R&D but also, and mostly, of small new ﬁrms.
3and Rodrik, 2003; Iyigun and Rodrik, 2004; UNDP, 2004).
Lazonick (2008) oﬀers an interesting perspective on the role of entrepreneurship in
economic development, based on his previous work on historical and comparative studies
of development in industrialized countries (see for instance Lazonick, 2007). The basic
argument is that in developing countries, entrepreneurial activity is more an innovating
activity dictated by necessity and aimed at surviving and overcoming constraints, rather
than an innovating activity aimed at capturing proﬁtable opportunities within set and
reasonably operating stable parameters, as is usually the case in industrialized economies.
In the absence of a “developmental state”, complete with its established operating param-
eters as enforceable rules and regulations, entrepreneurship may become “institutional
entrepreneurialism” (Boettke and Leeson, 2009) whereby entrepreneurs self-organize to
undertake both productive and non-productive economic activity (Baumol, 1990).
Following on from Baumol (1990) and Lazonick (2008), a crucial point in our approach
is the felt need to move away from the account of entrepreneurship incentives in developed
countries, evident in much of the literature (Audretsch et al., 2006; Casson et al., eds,
2008; Acs, 2006), to the design of the conditions that favour productive entrepreneurship
and contribute to the stability of the “developmental state” (UNDP, 2004; Iyigun and
Rodrik, 2004; UN-DESA, 2007; Naud´ e, 2007). Contextualized in, and regulated by, the
developmental state entrepreneurship could have immeasurable potential for preventing,
managing, and transforming conﬂicts (Justino, 2009) which are often rooted in poverty and
bolstered by unstable, unpredictable, and uncertain operating environments characteristic
of new, failing or failed states. We will turn to this in next section.
2.2 Entrepreneurship in in-conﬂict, post-conﬂict, and fragile countries
Entrepreneurship in non-conﬂict, industrialized contexts is underpinned by capital ac-
cumulation, concentration of assets, suﬃcient degrees of sophistication in infrastructure
development and the mode of governance, and a high level of social cohesiveness which
collectively allow for further accumulation of both physical and social capital. The success
of a developmental state can only be measured if its actions are conducive to productive
entrepreneurial activity. And, it is only under a successful developmental state that non-
productive entrepreneurship is discouraged. This is unlikely to occur under a condition of
conﬂict, civil conﬂict, or enduring war.
Indeed, the causes of violent conﬂict and more generally the “context of war” (Naud´ e,
2007) have been underlined as crucial aspects to be considered in designing reconstruction
policies aimed at facilitating entrepreneurial activity. While the next section provides a
brief historical account of the conﬂict in Afghanistan, in the rest of this section we review
the conceptual and empirical literature that have identiﬁed the most relevant eﬀects of
conﬂict—war and armed civil conﬂict—on the welfare and behaviour of households and,
as a consequence, on the necessary conditions to ease barriers or provide incentives for
starting an entrepreneurial activity.
Conﬂicts may have many origins. Gurr (1970) deﬁnes conﬂict in relation to deprivation,
4looking at the extreme end of the spectrum of income distribution and not excluding the
potential contribution of ethnicity, religious segregation, political and ideological group-
ing and country-based or regional divides.2 Conﬂicts also have many consequences on
economic development (Chen et al., 2007). Most of the literature analyzing the eﬀects
of conﬂict deals with issues of security and reconstruction at the macro level and with
the role of the state agency (e.g. Collier, 1999; Cramer, 2006). Much less has been said
about the microeconomic impact of conﬂict and the extent to which it deters or deﬁnes
entrepreneurial activity.
Justino (2009), Binzel and Br¨ uck (2007), and Br¨ uck and Schindler (2009) provide
extensive overviews of the eﬀects of conﬂict on household welfare and household coping
strategies, subject to the constraint that conﬂict is endogenously rooted in household be-
haviour and thus very diﬃcult to capture empirically. Justino (2009) suggests a distinction
between the direct and indirect eﬀects of conﬂict on households as a means to improve
inference on the impact.
Direct eﬀects of conﬂict on household welfare are those related to the immediate de-
struction of the household assets, both physical and human, due to violence and forced
displacement. This is very likely to have a strong and negative impact on the likelihood of
starting or continuing entrepreneurial activity, even when such activity is the only avail-
able coping strategy. The degree to which violence aﬀects a household is also a function of
the initial conditions of the household prior to violence: belonging to a speciﬁc ethnic or
religious group, the presence of males rather than females or of adults rather than children
might make the household more prone to becoming a target of and aﬀected by violence
or forced displacement. Food, security, and health deprivation due to conﬂict also hetero-
geneously aﬀect the composition of the surviving household and the likelihood of having
resources to cope. Binzel and Br¨ uck (2007) refer to these as the impacts of conﬂict via the
“shock component” on the overall vulnerability and risk exposure of the household. They
also take into account the “institutional component” which aﬀects—indirectly through the
ex ante and ex post coping strategies—the household vulnerability.
The indirect eﬀects of conﬂict are related to the institutional, market, political and
distributional disruptions which might indirectly aﬀect the general level of household wel-
fare (Justino, 2009) and the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurial activities. Conﬂict
might indirectly aﬀect the potential to start entrepreneurial activities through the destruc-
tion of social networks due to forced displacements and migration (Amuedo-Dorantes and
Pozo, 2006). Further, migrant refugees are likely to “re-appear” in the form of remittances
to the households remaining in the conﬂict area and this might have a double-sided eﬀect:
one in terms of contribution to the reconstruction of households’ ﬁnancial assets, the other
on the lowering of incentives to start entrepreneurial activity as a survival strategy. This
has been a particularly overlooked area in the empirical literature, to which this work
aims to contribute. A diﬀerent problem occurs when internally displaced persons (IDP)
2On the link between income inequality and conﬂict see also Ravallion (1988), Cramer (2006), Justino
(2008).
5(non-migrants) return to their original home, inducing disputes on the allocation of assets
and resources they owned before they were forced to leave.
One of the most complex of the indirect eﬀects of conﬂict on household welfare relates
to the labour and goods markets as well as infrastructure for market access. According to
Justino (2009) and consistent with Baumol (1990) and Naud´ e (2007), the type of response
that households might develop in reaction to violent and persistent conﬂict depends on
the ability of shifting to alternative economic activities, either to beneﬁt from predatory
behaviour, rent-seeking and illegal activities during armed conﬂict, or to engage in some
form of legal coping strategy which might include the start of a new business. There is
no consensus on this, however, given the problems of endogeneity of household behaviour
in a conﬂict context and the initial conditions of the individual household, which surely
shapes the reaction to negative shocks such as persistent conﬂict.
Finally, and of much interest to this paper, long term conﬂict is argued to be the
key cause of persistent poverty traps into which vast swathes of the population around
the globe seem to have fallen in the aftermath of/or during conﬂicts, which seriously
hamper policies aimed at reconstruction and poverty elimination (Ravallion, 1988; Hoeﬄer
and Reynal-Querol, 2003; Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2007; Justino, 2008).3 Empirical analysis
has shown that long term conﬂicts in such cases as Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and
Burundi have all caused destruction of households’ physical human and social capital and
rendering them increasingly poor and irredeemably vulnerable.
Naud´ e (2007) elaborates on some of the policy areas underlined by Justino (2009)
and addresses more speciﬁcally the conditions that would be conducive to (continued or
increased) entrepreneurial activity. Drawing on Baumol (1990), Naud´ e (2007) is cautious
in promoting entrepreneurship in the abstract and “institutional entrepreneurialism” as
the pro-growth engine and panacea for development and reconstruction eﬀorts within
in- and post-conﬂict countries, as sometimes is argued (Acs, 2006; Audretsch and Keil-
bach, 2008; Iyigun and Rodrik, 2004; Lazonick, 2008). In severe in-conﬂict cases such as
Afghanistan, entrepreneurship has a tendency to be driven by an instinct to survive and
some might become destructive or unproductive. As such, cases like Afghanistan would be
expected to have numerous examples of rent-seeking behaviour as the main driver of (de-
structive and unproductive) entrepreneurial activity (see for instance Cooper, 2006; Khan
and Jomo, 2000; Khan, 2005).
From the reconstruction and development policy perspective, it certainly makes sense
to distinguish between diﬀerent types of entrepreneurship and nurture (through interven-
tion) activities more consistent with reconstruction objectives. However, in the case of
Afghanistan as a country suﬀering from chronic conﬂict, it might still be appropriate and
relevant to consider survivalist entrepreneurial activities—where this does not include rent-
seeking or illegal activities—as desirable and, at least potentially, development enhancing.
3The case of Afghanistan should be best taken into account in a dynamic perspective, considering the
nature, causes, and patterns of the violent conﬂict aﬀecting this country. Unfortunately, access to NRVA
data has been very arduous. A dynamic perspective to the present analysis will be attempted in our future
work once we have completed access to past and future rounds of NRVA survey.
6Even “unproductive” entrepreneurs—in Baumol’s (1990) words—can be relevant in a con-
text which is persistently in-conﬂict, fragile, and developing (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2007),
or in transition (Smallbone and Welter, 2001; Kalantaridis and Labrianidis, 2004; Estrin
et al., 2006). In this respect, our argument is in line with the idea that stretching the
deﬁnition of entrepreneurship to include small business is important, not only from the
empirical point of view when measuring entrepreneurship on the basis of household surveys
but also from a policy perspective. While “it is important not to romanticize these penni-
less entrepreneurs” (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2007), we must take into account the U-shaped
relationship found between entrepreneurship and development (Acs, 2006).4
Naud´ e (2007) emphasizes the importance of understanding the context of conﬂict and
the opportunities it oﬀers for rent-seeking or productive entrepreneurial activity. In-depth
understanding of the context would allow for inferring the likelihood of success for recon-
struction programmes in countries with fragile states and/or the possibility of relapse into
disorder and conﬂict. The emphasis on the context recalls the indirect eﬀects of conﬂict
on household welfare (Binzel and Br¨ uck, 2007; Justino, 2009) and on the likelihood of
engaging in small business and entrepreneurial activity, which is the focus of this paper.
Nevertheless, in assessing these indirect eﬀects we must bear in mind that they are en-
dogenous both to household welfare and entrepreneurship, as are the type and quality of
institutions, and their dynamics alongside the various stages in the course of development.5
Empirical investigation of the issues discussed above on conﬂict and entrepreneurship
requires data that is not available from oﬃcial surveys. A few of the reviewed contributions
call for attempts to be made to develop new databases or complementary methodologies
for the assessment of the impact of conﬂict at the micro (household) level of analysis
(Binzel and Br¨ uck, 2007; Br¨ uck and Schindler, 2009; Justino, 2008; Justino, 2009). Most
of the traditional literature on security and reconstruction policies deals with the role of the
state and state agencies in facilitating or curtailing development and, as a consequence, on
areas of policy intervention at the macro level (Chen et al., 2007; Collier, 1999; Cramer,
2006). The challenge is therefore to collect reliable data on neglected countries, such
as Afghanistan, and to be able to conduct empirical evidence on the eﬀect of conﬂict on
household deprivation. Despite the fact that the boundaries between ﬁrms and households
are often blurred in conﬂict and fragile contexts, it is nevertheless important to maintain
a focus on micro level analysis as a crucial methodological priority, as this is the level at
which the roots and sources of entrepreneurial activity can be discerned. This work is an
attempt to face this challenge, and a contribution to ﬁlling the gap in economics research
on the direct and indirect eﬀects of enduring conﬂict on household’s wellbeing and on their
capability to conduct value adding activities.
4According to Acs (2006) the lack of formal sector employment in a severely underdeveloped country
lowers the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship. Along with development, the formal sector grows and
entrepreneurship rates, measured by self-employment, will decrease, only to increase again at a later stage
of development, with increased number of start-ups and new opportunities for proﬁt making activities.
5See Cimoli et al. (2006), Parto et al. (2005) and Parto (2008) for extensive and critical discussion on
this issue.
73 Afghanistan: A brief history of conﬂict
The current Afghan boundaries were set in 1893 through a treaty with Britain and as
part of an attempt by Britain to create a buﬀer between its interests in India and Russia’s
territorial ambitions to the south. One important feature of the treaty was the splitting
up of the Pashtun ethnic group along the infamous “Durand Line” between Afghanistan
and British India, which at the time included the present-day Pakistan. With Pakistan
emerging as a nation in 1948 and increased tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
Afghanistan shifted its foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and started an intermittent
period of modernization. A number of economic and political crises led to a coup in 1978
and the 1979 invasion by the Soviet Union. The chaos and anarchy that followed the ouster
of the last remaining Soviet-backed president (Najibullah) in 1991 lasted until 1996 when
a group of largely Pashtun fundamentalist extremists backed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates took power and declared Afghanistan an Islamic Emirate.
The seeds of what became the Taliban, however, had been sewn in the 1980s in Pakistan
as part of the Cold War policy of creating formidable local resistance to, and aggression
toward, the Soviet Union in Central Asia: scores of the Taliban had taken religious and
military instructions at the many thousands of Madressas set up in the mid to late 1980s
by the fundamentalist Pakistani military dictator, Zia ul-Haq, with approval and ﬁnancial
support from his anti-Soviet sponsors.6
When not blowing up Buddha statues, beating on women wearing white socks, or
carrying out ethnic cleansing, the Taliban did little or nothing to regenerate economic
development. In fact, there are numerous accounts of the Taliban attempting to system-
atically “cleanse” Afghanistan of its anti-Islamic ways and less desirable (non-Pashtun and
non-Sunni Muslim) citizens, often through wholesale destruction of the social networks and
the economic bases of the targeted communities, including burning or dousing with diesel
farms and vineyards. The destruction that ensued under the Taliban was compounded by
a persistent drought in many parts of the country with millions of Afghans migrating to
the neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. The economy remains largely in ruins with most of
the government services either non-existent or not conducive to productive entrepreneurial
activity. Regional warlords remain in power in large swathes of the country, many of which
were declared as “Taliban-free” soon after the fall of the Taliban in 2002. While the threat
of an even more brutal return by the Taliban remains real and a major source of anxiety
for Afghans and non-Afghans, it has to be pointed out that Afghanistan’s current prob-
lems stem from three main factors: ineﬀective government, a general and widespread lack
of security due to increased levels of criminality (such as kidnapping) aimed at anyone
or anything that could yield some economic rent through extortion, and the failure for a
sound economic base to emerge following the ouster of the Taliban in 2002.
Against this background we undertook to examine how entrepreneurial activity has
been aﬀected and whether or not there is a relationship between entrepreneurial activity
6For a detailed and excellent account of regional geopolitics centred on Afghanistan see Coll (2004).
8and the many facets of conﬂict as brieﬂy described in the preceding paragraphs.
4 Data and methodology
We use the 2005 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) to examine the
relation between the intensity of conﬂict and the likelihood that a household holds an
entrepreneurial activity across the districts of Afghanistan. In this section we provide a
brief introduction to the NRVA database and the sample (4.1), and describe the sets of
control variables used to explain the likelihood of entrepreneurial activity (4.2).
4.1 NRVA data
4.1.1 Survey design
NRVA is an extensive national household survey, conducted by the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the Central Statistics Oﬃce (CSO) with
the support of the European Union (EU) across the whole country (e.g. MRRD and
CSO, 2007). The survey was carried out in 2003, 2005, and 2007-8. In this paper we
use data only from the 2005 dataset since the 2003 dataset used a substantially diﬀerent
set of questions and sampling strategy and the 2007 data have not been publicly released
yet. NRVA 2005 was collected by 650 interviewers of both genders and at two main levels:
the community/village and the household. The interviews for community/village data
were held with local governing bodies, known as shuras, while quasi-randomly selected
households were used to collect household data, in the same village. The sample consists
of 30,822 households from the rural, urban, and Kuchi (nomadic) communities across all 34
provinces and all except 6 districts as oﬃcially deﬁned in 2005 for a total of 392 districts.
The survey has a complex design, divided into 45 strata (the 34 provinces plus the
urban areas). In each stratum a number of clusters (primary sample units—PSU) of 12
households were randomly selected, to achieve a balanced sample across strata. The large
diﬀerence of the population size across strata has required a deviation from the balanced
sample (for very large and very small strata), which was controlled by use of sampling
weights.7
4.1.2 Sample
The 30,822 households make up 227,070 individuals over a population of approximately
22.1 million people.8
7The household selection follows a quasi random process: the total number of dwellings in a community
(PSUs) was divided by 12, and the resulting number was to account for the distance between two inter-
viewed households so as to spread the information collected within a PSU. Further details are available
from MRRD and CSO (2007).
8Estimates from the oﬃcial census the Central Statistics Oﬃce of Afghanistan (CSO) is under-
going: http://www.cso-af.net/cso/index.php?page=14&language=en&block=2&menutitle=Census ac-
cessed February 2009.
9The Kuchi (1,735 households, 5.63 percent) were dropped from the sample for two main
reasons. First, being nomadic, the Kuchi move across districts and provinces, making the
intensity of conﬂict an endogenous variable (if one were to assume that the Kuchi are
likely to move to areas with better economic prospects). Second, as shown in Figure 5 in
Appendix D, the distribution of activities through which households gain their ﬁrst source
of income is quite diﬀerent between the Kuchi and the rest of the population. Only a
small number of Kuchi households rely on small businesses to generate income.9
Dropping the households with missing values further reduces the sample to 24,496
households with 979 missing answers on the dependent variable (source of income), and
the remaining missing values distributed across various regressors. With respect to the
entrepreneurship variable, we do not ﬁnd any evident source of bias in the missing response.
With reference to the independent variables, missing values do not alter signiﬁcantly the
distribution of values across strata (see Figure 2, Appendix A), apart froma1p ercent
point reduction for the Kabul population, and are not missing for security reasons. See
Appendix A for more details on the distribution of missing observations.
4.2 Variables and econometric strategy
4.2.1 Variables
An entrepreneurial household (EntrBus), henceforth used interchangeably with entrepre-
neur, is deﬁned as one that earns parts or all its income from a small business.10 We have
no information about the size of the business, the sector, or the proprietary structure.
To reduce the noise of deﬁnition fuzziness we exclude income from wage labour, growing
crops, raising livestock or food production and sale, opium production and sale, small
services such as milling, petty trade, sale of wood or transportation, and handicrafts.11
Those services are in fact closer to a deﬁnition of self-employed than entrepreneur, and are
more likely to be temporary activities. We are not claiming these activities would not be
interesting to analyse. Based on the discussion in Section 2 we prefer to limit the study to
the determinants of more formally deﬁned business activities, and leave the analysis of the
eﬀect of conﬂict on self-employment for further analysis. Based on interviewees responses,
only 9 percent of the households in Afghanistan rely on a small business as a source of
income (Table 2), which are very unevenly distributed across the provinces (Figure 6) and
districts.
The main determinant we want to test for is the intensity of conﬂict. This is measured
in various ways and with reference to a number of diﬀerent data source to control for
the variability in data collection and reporting (Table 1). None of the sources can in
fact be safely assumed to be current and complete as far as reporting on the conﬂict. To
9Most of their income derives from sale (7) and own consumption (2) of livestock, and shepherding
(11). All activities that, on the contrary, generate income for a very small portion of both urban and rural
households.
10Mentioned as “small business” in the questionnaire.
11For a full list of income sources among which the respondents could choose see MRRD and CSO (2007).
10compensate for this, we use various indicators from various years, reﬂecting the diﬀerent
aspects of the conﬂict and violence in relation to human wellbeing. In Section 5.1 we
compare the measures in Table 1 and select “Insecurity Shock” (ShockInsec) as the variable
with the highest precision with respect to our analysis. This variable reports, the direct
household’s experience of a shock due to violence in the year preceding the interview.
There are at least two advantages in using this indicator. First, it originates from the
same household that also responds to questions on undertaking entrepreneurial activity
and other control variables and thus increases data coherence. Second, it also has the
largest sample coverage.
Table 1: Conﬂict intensity indicators
Level Year Description Measure Source
Objective measures
Days war District 2002 Days from ﬁrst to last
episode of exposure to
hostilities
Relative to max. district
average (across villages)
BM
Victims District 2002 Number of killed or in-
jured from direct violence
Relative to max. district
average (across villages)
BM
Ground operations District 2002 Community has seen at
least one ground operation
percent of villages within
the district
BM
Mines victims District 2002 Community had a large
number of victims from
landmines/UXO 1 year
before 9/11
percent of villages within
the district
BM
Incidents Province 2007 Number of security inci-
dents
Relative to max. province AFM
Taliban AGE Province 2007 Number of attacks carried
out by Taliban or Anti-
Government Elements
Relative to max. province CS
HR violations Province 2007/0812 Total number of violations
of human rights
Relative to max. province AIHRC
Attack education Province 2006 Number of attacks on ed-
ucational facilities
Relative to max. province HRW
Subjective experience
Insecurity shock District 2005 The households has expe-
rienced a shock due to in-
security/violence
percent of HH sampled in
the district
NRVA
Violence District 2006 At least one member was
victim of physical aggres-
sion, in the village
percent of HH sampled in
the district
AF
Continued on next page...
121386 in the Persian calendar.
12Violations include right to: life, personal integrity, security of person, due process of law, property,
housing, education, adequate standard of leaving, health, marriage, freedom of movement, and work.
11... Table 1 continued
Subjective evaluation
Security problem District 2006 Security is the biggest
problem in the area13
percent of HH sample in
the district
AF
Expected conﬂict District 2006 Security and conﬂict re-
lated issues are the biggest
problem in the area14
percent of HH sampled in
the district
AF
Perceived security District 2006 Rate of the security situa-
tion (1-4 scale)
Relative to max district
average
AF
Sources: own elaboration on BN (Benini and Moulton, 2004), AFM (Afghan Conﬂict Monitor—http://
www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/incidentsbyprov07.jpg), CS (Campbell and Shapiro, 2009), AIHRC
(Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, 2008), HRW (Human Rights Watch, 2007), NRVA
(National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment), AF (The Asian Foundation household survey).
As seen in previous sections, the conﬂict can have a direct and indirect eﬀect on a
household’s economic and survival decisions. These can depend on household features and
individual characteristics, as well as on the state of the environment, and the relation of
the household with the environment. Conﬂict may have a complementary or substitute
eﬀect on entrepreneurial decision, with respect to other environmental features. In order
to correctly assess the eﬀect of conﬂict on entrepreneurial activity and to which extent
this goes unimpeded despite the conﬂict, and to identify the conditions under which en-
trepreneurial activity is more likely to exist throughout the country, we control for ﬁve
diﬀerent dimensions. A full list and description of the variables used for each of the ﬁve
dimensions is given in Table 2. The table also reports the descriptive statistics.
First, household features usually explain a large extent of the probability to start
an entrepreneurial activity.15 With the aim to assess similarities and peculiarities of the
Afghan case, we control for features such as gender, marriage status, education, age, health,
and urban location. Assets are relevant in signalling for ﬁnancial constraints (Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989), but are also likely to represent a higher risk under insecure and conﬂict
conditions (Br¨ uck, 2004; Bundervoet, 2007). As ﬁrst indicators of the entrepreneurial
motives, we also control for crowding in or out eﬀects of social contributions and aid
programmes, and for the risk exposure proxied by the household size and the diversiﬁcation
of income sources.
Second, access to resources is of clear importance to be able to start and run a business
(Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). We analyse the eﬀect of diﬀerent formal and informal
13Includes security issues/attacks/violence, kidnapping of children and innocent people being killed by
Americans.
14Includes security issues/attacks/violence, presence of warlords, Taliban, kidnapping of children, Amer-
ican soldiers searching houses without permission, and innocent people being killed by Americans.
15Standard references that employ a similar set of variables are, among others, Evans and Jovanovic
(1989), Evans and Leighton (1989), and Astebro and Bernhardt (2003).
12potential sources of credit,16 access to a loan, its use, and the local availability of credit
institutions. Remittances represent another source of ﬁnancing which may support private
investment (e.g. Funkhouser, 1992), or crowd it out (e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo,
2006), and represent a relevant aspect of conﬂict induced forced migration.
Moving to less tangible assets, social capital is one of the channels through which
conﬂict aﬀects households indirectly. Although relations with friends are not always valued
more by entrepreneurs (e.g. Djankov et al., 2006), in developing economies the possibility to
rely on friends or family members may reduce the risk of private investment (Ravallion and
Lokshin, 2005). Access to information is also a crucial aspect of entrepreneurial activity,
and in the absence of infrastructure information may more easily ﬂow through informal
channels built on social capital.17 We control for both mutual help and information channel
to assess this eﬀect in the conﬂict conditions of Afghanistan.
Similarly, formal governance institutions represent the main channel through which
conﬂict indirectly aﬀects households and entrepreneurship behaviour (Binzel and Br¨ uck,
2007; Justino, 2009). We control for the eﬀect of diﬀerent institutional settings, cap-
turing some aspects of local conﬂict, representativeness, and rent-seeking summarized in
Naud´ e (2007) as drivers of unproductive entrepreneurship:18 government participation,
community representation and decentralized decision making,19 and return of displaced
households.
The ﬁfth dimension covers the physical capital households can access to via infrastruc-
ture. Infrastructure are also the main obstacle to entrepreneurial activity—another indi-
rect product of conﬂict—indicated by Afghan people (e.g. Parto et al., 2007; IRIN, 2009).
We control for road infrastructure, access to markets, and access to electricity via public
provision, community, and private investment.
Table 2: Variables description
Variable Description Mean St. D. Min. Max.
DEPENDENT
EntrBus (H) [1] A small business is a (partial) source of
income
0.089 0.284 0 1
CONFLICT INTENSITY
Continued on next page...
16Astebro and Bernhardt (2003) show that in the US the second main source of debt for start-ups is
other family members, followed by reﬁnanced homes and friends. In emerging markets the informal sources
of external capital are 87 to 100 percent (Lingelbach et al., 2005).
17For example Gomez and Santor (2001) show the positive eﬀect of informal business relations on self-
employment in Canada.
18See also Khan and Jomo (2000) and Khan (2005).
19Formal institutions and rule of law have recently gained a huge attention in the development literature
and policy (e.g. Besley, 1995; Glaeser et al., 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2003).
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ShockInsec0 (D) [%] no HH sampled in the district have ex-
perienced in t − 1 a shock due to inse-
curity (reference dummy)
0.555 0.497 0 1
ShockInsec05 (D) [%] less than 50 percent of HH sampled in
the district have experienced in t − 1a
shock due to insecurity
0.421 0.494 0 1
ShockInsec1 (D) [%] more than 50 percent of HH sampled in
the district have experienced in t − 1a
shock due to insecurity
0.024 0.155 0 1
Priority Disarm (V) [1] disarmament is a priority for the Shura
(male or female)
0.063 0.243 0 1
HOUSEHOLD FEATURES
MenOnly (H) [1] more than 50 percent of the income gen-
erating activities are conducted by men
only
0.91 0.289 0 1
Literacy (H) [1] more than 50 percent of the HH mem-
bers are literate
0.213 0.41 0 1
Priority Edu (V) [1] education is a priority for either the
male or the female Shura
0.648 0.477 0 1
HHMemb2 (H) [1] HH members are less than 3 (reference
dummy)
0.018 0.131 0 1
HHMemb5 (H) [1] HH members are between 3 and 5 0.224 0.417 0 1
HHMemb10 (H) [1] HH members are between 6 and 10 0.637 0.481 0 1
HHMemb15 (H) [1] HH members are between 11 and 15 0.103 0.304 0 1
HHMemb22 (H) [1] HH members are more than 15 0.018 0.135 0 1
Age (H) [R] log of the average age of the HH mem-
bers
3.023 0.322 0 4.454
SocialContr (H) [1] the HH receives government beneﬁts or
a pension
0.007 0.087 0 1
Activities (H) [R] number of income generating activities
per number of HH member
0.264 0.156 0.045 2
Urban (H) [1] the household lives in a urban area 0.166 0.373 0 1
Assets (H) [N] total number of assets owned by the HH 1.695 0.410 0 3.178
ACCESS TO RESOURCES
Credit None (H) [1] No potential source of credit (reference
dummy)
0.085 0.278 0 1
Credit Inform (H) [1] family (informal) as potential source of
credit
0.772 0.420 0 1
Credit Lender (H) [1] money lenders as potential source of
credit
0.133 0.339 0 1
Credit Bank (H) [1] micro credit and banks as potential
source of credit
0.003 0.054 0 1
Continued on next page...
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Credit Other (H) [1] other potential sources of credit 0.008 0.09 0 1
Loan (H) [1] the HH has obtained a loan in t − 1 0.386 0.487 0 1
LoanInvest (H) [1] loan obtained is used for business in-
vestment
0.015 0.12 0 1
Priority Credit (V) [1] micro credit is a priority for either the
male or the female Shura
0.036 0.186 0 1
RemitContr (H) [1] remittances are among the HH income
sources
0.072 0.258 0 1
SOCIAL CAPITAL
InfoNews (H) [1] media sources of HH information (ref-
erence dummy)
0.40 0.49 0 1
InfoForm (H) [1] formal sources of HH information
(mainly formal institutions)
0.106 0.307 0 1
InfoInfor (H) [1] informal sources of HH information
(mainly friends, market and associa-
tions)
0.478 0.5 0 1
InfoBus (H) [1] business and work associate source of
HH information
0.015 0.120 0 1
HelpFriends (H) [N] number of ways in which HH
give/receive help to/from friends
0.96 1.811 0 19
INSTITUTIONS
MemberGov (H) [1] the HH participates in one of the local
government bodies
0.213 0.409 0 1
Decisions (V) [N] total number of decisions taken by each
government body present in the com-
munity
3.441 2.682 0 22
ShockReturn (D) [%] percentage of HH within the district
that have experienced in the previous
year a shock due to returnees
0.006 0.016 0 0.13
Returnees (V) [R] log of returned HH to the community
in the last three years
2.312 1.673 0 7.314
Returnees Go (V) [R] log of returned HH to the community in
the last three years that have left again
0.741 1.267 0 5.994
INFRASTRUCTURE
MktClose (V) [1] market is close to the community (less
than 1 hour)
0.493 0.5 0 1
ElectrNo (H) [1] HH has no access to electricity (refer-
ence dummy)
0.761 0.426 0 1
ElectrPub (H) [1] HH has public access to electricity 0.150 0.357 0 1
ElectrPriv (H) [1] HH has private access to electricity (pri-
vate generator)
0.035 0.183 0 1
Continued on next page...
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ElectrComm (H) [1] HH has community access to electricity
(community generator)
0.054 0.225 0 1
RoadKm (V) [R] log of the km distance of the closest
drivable road
0.818 1.016 0 4.605
Notes: Squared terms of variables inserted in the analysis are not listed here. (H): information across
households; (V): information across villages; (D): information across districts. [1]: Dummy; [%] ratio; [N]
count data; [R] continuous.
4.2.2 Econometric strategy
To analyse the impact of conﬂict, and the above set of control variables, on the proba-
bility that a household has an entrepreneurial activity we run a Complementary log-log
(CLogLog) model.20 In formal terms we deﬁne Y = 1 when a household earns parts or
all its income from a small business, where Y is the dependent variable EntrBus.W e
estimate the probability that Y = 1, conditional to the state of conﬂict intensity and of
the ﬁve sets of control variables listed above (X):
Pr(Y =1 |X)=1− exp[−exp(Xβ)]
The predicted probability of each household l can thus be expressed as:













where α is a constant, c is the indicator of conﬂict intensity, H is the set of household vari-
ables, R the access to resources variables, S social capital variables, I formal institutions
variables, F the infrastructure variables, and P a set of provincial dummies; the diﬀerent
β are the corresponding coeﬃcients.
The complex design used for data collection (see Section 4.1.1) requires some correc-
tions in the estimations: most importantly, sample weights to obtain estimates representa-
tive of the whole population, a correction of the variance estimation that takes into account
the higher similarity of data clustered in PSU,21 and the fact that sampled households are
20The CLogLog model is better suited to deal with skewed dichotomous dependent variables such as
ours, as it is asymmetric around zero (as opposed to symmetric Probit and Logit models) (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2009). More importantly, the CLogLog model assumes that the residuals can be represented
by an extreme value distribution (Powers and Xie, 2000), which is crucial when the latent variables in
our estimate is much closer to such an asymmetric distribution than to a normal or logistic symmetric
distribution. Although we ﬁnally opted for this econometric model to be on the safe side, comparisons
between Probit, Logit, and CLogLog show that with the latter the marginal eﬀect are usually smaller, and
the predicted probability of a positive event always higher. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper the
diﬀerences in the results across models are negligible, and the signiﬁcant role of variables, as well as the
directions of their impact, never diﬀer.
21Which implicitly corrects for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White computation (Gould et al., 2006).
16drawn from a ﬁnite population without replacement (FPC correction).22 Therefore, all
following results that use the household data are obtained using survey techniques, unless
diﬀerently speciﬁed.23
5 Results
5.1 Location of conﬂict and entrepreneurial activity
To answer our ﬁrst question on the relation between conﬂict and entrepreneurial activity we
establish whether there is evidence of a relationship between the number of entrepreneurs
and the intensity of conﬂict in diﬀerent areas of Afghanistan. In Figure 1 we compute the
non-parametric, locally weighted regression (LOWESS) on the relation between a number
of indicators of conﬂict intensity24 and the percentage of entrepreneurs within a district or
province. We derive two fundamental results from this univariate relation. First, overall
the percentage of households involved in entrepreneurial activity in a district or province
is barely aﬀected by the intensity of the conﬂict in the same region (district or province).
Second, the subjective experience and the perception of conﬂict (full series) have a (mild)
negative impact on the number of households involved in entrepreneurial activity for a
large spread of violence within a district, or high levels of insecurity perceived. In most
cases the pattern is slightly concave. On the contrary, objective indicators of the conﬂict
intensity (dashed lines) all show no eﬀect on the concentration of entrepreneurial activity.25
To conﬁrm this ﬁnding we regress the relation between the percentage of entrepreneurial
household per district, and the diﬀerent conﬂict indicators. Figure 7 in Appendix D shows
the results from a quantile regression using a subset of the conﬂict indicators. In partic-
ular, we drop the indicators that have a pairwise correlation higher than 0.5 (Table 4)
and all those from the Benini and Moulton (2004) data, which cover a small sample in
any case. Figure 7 strongly conﬁrms the lack of relation between the percentage of en-
trepreneurs among the households and the intensity of conﬂict, regardless of how conﬂict
is measured.26 The quantile regression also conﬁrms that while objective conﬂict measures
have absolutely no eﬀect, the subjective perception and the direct impact of violence on
22See Deaton (1997) for a full discussion on the treatment of survey data.
23All analysis uses the survey settings implemented in Stata 10.
24See Table 1 for a deﬁnition of the indicators.
25Two caveats need to accompany these ﬁndings with respect to the objective measures. First, the
years from which the data have been drawn are diﬀerent than the year for which the NRVA data (2005)
is available (see Table 1). In particular, the Benini and Moulton (2004) data are from 2002, while the
other provincial indicators refer mainly to 2007. Second, Benini and Moulton (2004) collected data only
from communities that were previously classiﬁed as conﬂict areas and covering only about 30 percent of
the districts sampled for NRVA 2005. Despite these limitations, the common trend of all the indicators for
diﬀerent years and areas produces a robust result. Moreover, the conﬂict areas did not change substantially
between 2005 and 2007. The current intensiﬁcation of conﬂict began in earnest in early 2008.
26To check the robustness of this result we ran several regressions with several speciﬁcations, including
and excluding correlated and the Benini and Moulton (2004) variables. We used the logarithm of the
non-percentaged variables and standardized values for all variables. The result does not change, even if
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Figure 1: Relation between local conﬂict intensity and entrepreneurship: LOWESS curve.
On the horizontal axis diﬀerent indicators of district or province relative conﬂict intensity. On the
vertical axis the percentage of entrepreneur in the same area. Dots refer to the relation between
the percentage of HH experiencing violence within a district, and the percentage of entrepreneurs.
————————
Note: The ﬁgure is rescaled between 0 and 30 percent for a more focused comparison between LOWESS
patterns, but the actual percentage of entrepreneurs per district reaches 92 percent. Source: see Table 1.
the households have a negative impact on the percentage of entrepreneurs in the area
for very large shares of households experiencing the insecurity, or households worried by
events related to insecurity. Indeed, the very large conﬁdence intervals for the largest
quantiles also suggest that this negative eﬀect is very mixed. In fact, none of these conﬂict
indicators is ever signiﬁcant.
The above ﬁndings raise a few important questions: ﬁrst, does after 30 years of con-
ﬂict a diﬀerent intensity still have an eﬀect on entrepreneurial behaviour? Second, if the
intensity of conﬂict does not hamper entrepreneurial activity across diﬀerent locations
in Afghanistan, what does? Third, does conﬂict have an indirect negative eﬀect on en-
trepreneurship through other dimensions?27 And, does the conﬂict have a “positive” eﬀect
on entrepreneurship as a survival coping strategy, such as the the negative and “positive”
eﬀect cancel out?
In what follows we present the results from our analysis of the determinants of en-
27In line with what Binzel and Br¨ uck (2007) and Justino (2009) indicate as the indirect eﬀects of conﬂict
to be taken into account within a micro-level framework.
18trepreneurial activity across households controlling for household features, access to re-
sources, social capital indicators, formal institutions and infrastructure. We mainly answer
the second question and identify the factors that explain the likelihood of a household un-
dertaking entrepreneurial activity through running a small business as the main or part
of its income generating activities. On the basis of these results, we then speculate on the
indirect eﬀects that the conﬂict intensity may have on entrepreneurship, via the most rel-
evant of the household and environmental determinants, and on the survival motivations.
5.2 The determinants of entrepreneurship in Afghanistan
Table 6 (Appendix C) lists the CLogLog estimates for the ﬁve sets of regressors, while
Table 3 shows the marginal and impact eﬀects, together with goodness of ﬁt measures for
the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.28 Table 7 reports the matrix of pairwise correlations
between all regressors.
The multivariate estimates substantially conﬁrm the very weak negative relation be-
tween entrepreneurship and conﬂict intensity also when controlling for all sets of variables,
although this eﬀect doubles for districts with a very high diﬀusion of violence (ShockIn-
sec1). More surprising is the prediction of a higher probability for entrepreneurial activity
when the village sees disarmament as one of its priorities. As if the priority is referred to
armed groups that actually maintain a quite secure environment, which ease the activity
of entrepreneurs. We will come back in the end to the direct eﬀect of conﬂict, after com-
pleting the picture with the most interesting results from the ﬁve dimensions of controlling
variables.
Table 3: CLogLog marginal eﬀects: comparing sets
HH Res SC Inst Infr
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShockInsec05 -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ShockInsec1 -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.038***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Priority Disarm 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.028**
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28Province dummies are omitted from the marginal eﬀects table.














Returnees Go -0.004** -0.003**
(0.002) (0.002)
InfoForm -0.012** -0.011** -0.009*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
InfoInfor 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
InfoBus 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.053***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
HelpFriends -0.002* -0.002* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Credit Inform 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Credit Lender 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Credit Bank -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Credit Other 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Loan -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
LoanInvest 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.095***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Priority Credit -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
RemitContr -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MenOnly 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Literacy 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Priority Edu -0.009** -0.008** -0.008* -0.007* -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HHMemb5 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.070***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
HHMemb10 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.066***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Continued on next page...
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HHMemb15 0.108*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.130*** 0.135***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
HHMemb22 0.109** 0.130** 0.136** 0.141** 0.141**
(0.053) (0.058) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060)
Age 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.012
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.043) (0.047)
Age2 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
SocialContr -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Activities 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.213*** 0.217***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Activities2 -0.076** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.089***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Urban 0.071*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.038***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Assets 0.105*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.084***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Assets2 -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.024***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 24496 24496 24496 24496 24496
F-adjusted H-L
29 1.314 1.384 1.79 1.579 1.755
p-value
30 .224 .189 .065 .116 .072
LL
3132 -865811 -856335 -854237 -850619 -844343
McFadden R2 0.074 0.084 0.086 0.090 0.096
BIC’
33 -136862 -155734 -159888 -167065 -179556
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.2.1 Household features
Concerning the household features, only for some of the variables do we obtain results in
line with the usual household determinants of entrepreneurial activity found in developed
and stable countries. These are: the positive eﬀect of access to education, higher male
participation, urban location, and wealth indicator. Quite interestingly, wealth has a non-
linear relation, implying that for households with the highest wealth the opportunity cost
of an entrepreneurial activity is too high. Contrary to the standard results, we do not ﬁnd
any eﬀect of age, marriage, and health.34
29F-adjusted Hosmer-Lemeshow test for survey data (Archer and Lemeshow, 2006).
30Of the H-L test.
31All following diagnostic are obtained from a CLogLog with sampling weights and robust variance
estimation for clustered data (as opposed to the full survey design estimations.)
32Log-Likelihood for the CLogLog.
33Bayesian information criterion. For a precise deﬁnition see Long and Freese (2006).
34The last two variables have been dropped due to their bad ﬁt.
21More interestingly, we ﬁnd some preliminary evidence on the survivalist characteristic
of entrepreneurial activity among households in Afghanistan. The variables that have
by far the strongest impact on the likelihood of undertaking entrepreneurial activity are
those that proxy for the household size and the number of diﬀerent activities on which the
household relies for income generation (proportionally to the number of members)35.I n
a country in which the supply of labour is not lacking the fact that large households are
more likely to have a small business seems to be linked to survival and risk diversiﬁcation.
This is in line with the crowding out eﬀect of aid and state pension contributions, which
reduce the need to carry on an entrepreneurial activity. The large and positive eﬀect of
the number of income generating activities provides convincing evidence on the need to
share the risk of the entrepreneurial activity with other sources of income. The non-linear
relation once more conﬁrms that, provided the minimum income for a living is already
granted, there is no need for a small business.
5.2.2 Access to resources
The intensity of conﬂict does not seem to have an indirect eﬀect through the access to
resources: resource variables do not aﬀect the sign and intensity of the impact of conﬂict
on entrepreneurship. The role of the two factors seems to be independent. Despite this,
the access to resource variables do play some role in explaining entrepreneurial activity.
The credit sources of small business owners do not diﬀer from those of non-entrepreneurs,
apart from the higher likelihood of non-entrepreneurs to use informal sources such as
family or friends. We also note that although the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant, formal
credit sources are used less by entrepreneurial households. Here also the results seem to
indicate risk-averse entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are also less likely to receive a loan
than non-entrepreneurs although the amount of the loan, corrected for the equivalence
scale, is the same. This result reﬂects the predominant use of loans for food consumption
and is consistent with ﬁndings in other studies of credit in Afghanistan.36 Indeed, when we
turn to the use of the loan, business investment is the stronger predictor of entrepreneurial
activity among credit variables.
Finally, all migration related variables (migrants and remittances) have a negative
impact on entrepreneurship, as also reported by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), with
respect to migration. The negative eﬀect of remittances and migration37 supports our
conjecture that entrepreneurship is a strategy to cope with poverty and insecurity, rather
than a wealth accumulating activity. Remittances from emigrants, in fact, seem to reduce
the incentives to start up a small business. As mentioned in Section 2, this area of
research is particularly overlooked in the conﬂict literature, although forced displacement
35We have tried many diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the two variables to avoid a correlation eﬀect, using
the number of working members instead, dropping one or the other variable, a continuous value, but the
results do not change.
36See, for example, Klijn and Pain (2007) and Parto and Regmi (2009).
37The latter variable is dropped from the regression due to the high correlation with remittances, but
when introduced alone it also has a signiﬁcant negative impact on entrepreneurship.
22and migration do play a signiﬁcant role on the entrepreneurial decision.
5.2.3 Social capital
Maybe due to incorrect measurement or the actual absence therein, social capital appears
to add very little to the explanation of entrepreneurial activity. There is also very little
evidence that the intensity of conﬂict acts on entrepreneurship indirectly via social capital,
as the impact of the conﬂict variable is only slightly reduced by the addition of social
capital variables. It may well be the case that after more than 30 years of conﬂict it
makes no diﬀerence for an entrepreneur to have the support of relatives and neighbours
while this support may be of relative importance in actual conﬂict situations. If anything,
entrepreneurs appear to be slightly less likely to give to and receive help from friends.
Concerning the access to information, entrepreneurs are more likely to refer to me-
dia channels (the reference dummy), as opposed to other formal information sources such
as mullahs and government representatives. Business associations play a much more im-
portant role as far as knowledge provision, as pointed out in much of the literature in
developed and developing countries.
5.2.4 Formal institutions
The introduction of institutional variables induces the largest reduction in the eﬀect of
the conﬂict indicator on entrepreneurship. This occurs mainly through another shock to
which households are subject: the return of the displaced households. We observe a very
small positive eﬀect on the likelihood of entrepreneurial activity from the appearance of a
large number of returnees in a village. Conversely, we observe a small negative eﬀect on
entrepreneurship when the returnees are forced to leave again, signalling a conﬂict. Most
importantly, the fact that ethnic tension may be related to continuous displacements, and
that this has a negative impact on the entrepreneurial activity, is conﬁrmed by the large
negative marginal eﬀect of the proportion of households in a district that has experienced
a negative shock due to a large inﬂux of returnees. Put diﬀerently, a high number of
displaced households returning to a community are not per se a source of conﬂict. But
when this is the case, it is negatively related to local household entrepreneurial activities.
We now turn to the eﬀect of governing bodies and household participation. After
controlling for a number of indices and speciﬁcations, all the indicators such as government
bodies, number or type of decisions taken, and election of the bodies are negatively related
to entrepreneurial activity but none in a relevant way, and most of them not signiﬁcantly.
The only variable that was signiﬁcant (total number of decisions taken by government
bodies—Decisions) has a signiﬁcant, albeit small, negative impact. Overall, the results on
formal institutions seem to indicate that entrepreneurial households have a weak preference
for communities with lower security for property rights, larger possibility of regulatory
capture and rent-seeking, and a smaller participation of the rest of the community to the
process of public policy making. Along with this ﬁnding, we also observe a small but
23weakly signiﬁcant positive relation between being part of a government body and having
a small business. The two eﬀects together may well point to the fact that entrepreneurial
households are in favour of decisions being taken by formal governing bodies, but only when
they are part of them. The fact that the eﬀects of formal institutions are so small may
again be related (as for social capital) to an institutional setting that has de-constructed
during a long time of conﬂict, and that does not recognize the value of formal institutions.
Although Reynolds et al. (2004) also ﬁnd no evidence of an impact of protection of property
rights and level of corruption on entrepreneurship in developing countries, and Djankov
et al. (2006) ﬁnd mixed results for China and Russia.
5.2.5 Infrastructure
We do not ﬁnd a substantial weakening of the conﬂict indicator when we control for the
infrastructure variables, even if they do substantially add to the explanatory power of the
model. With respect to trade infrastructure, households living in communities relatively
closer to food markets have a higher probability of being entrepreneurs. The same occurs
with respect to the distance of the closest drivable road, but the eﬀect is non-linear.38 This
is probably due to the fact that the survival motivation of the entrepreneurial activity is
even stronger when there is no other option to access goods and products, especially in
the winter season.39
Similarly, access to electricity shows quite intuitive results. Households living in com-
munities with public access to electricity have a larger probability of being entrepreneurs.
Interestingly, the same occurs with regard to community generators, although we have
no information on how much the entrepreneurial household actually contributes to the
investment of a communal generator. Conversely, and supporting the survival hypothesis,
households that have access to a private generator are not more likely to have a small
business.
6 Summary of ﬁndings and discussion
In this work we have used the presence of a small business as a proxy of entrepreneurial
activity. According to the NRVA data for 2005, 9 percent of Afghan households undertake
some form of business activity as a source of income. The evidence suggests that en-
trepreneurial activity is mainly a means to survival, rather than of entrepreneurial spirit.
There seems to be a strong tendency by entrepreneurs to adapt to ongoing conﬂict and
continue to operate, mainly because continuing is the main or only source of income for
the household.
This is probably one of the reasons why we ﬁnd such a weak response to the ﬁrst
38A negative eﬀect is obtained also for very large distances of the food market. Results available from
the authors.
39Nenova and Harford (2004) report interesting evidence of private ﬁrms substituting for non-existing
services in Somalia.
24question on whether there are direct eﬀects of the ongoing conﬂict on the likelihood of
households to engage in entrepreneurial activities. Even when controlling for diﬀerent sets
of variables (and conﬂict indicators) the results show a negative, but very small, impact of
the intensity of conﬂict on entrepreneurship. This eﬀect is reduced by one fourth (in terms
of marginal eﬀect) when we introduce, besides the household characteristics, the following
sets of controlling variables: access to resources, social capital, formal institutions, and
infrastructure. Some dimensions contribute more than others to this reduction (namely
institutions, infrastructure, and social capital) but none of them can soundly be considered
the transmission chain of an indirect eﬀect of conﬂict. Overall, social capital, institutions,
and infrastructure turn out to be more complementary than substitute explanations of
conﬂict. The static analysis we could carry out with the currently available data thus
shows a quite weak relevance also of the indirect eﬀects of conﬂict on entrepreneurial
activities through other channels. The conclusions are diﬀerent when we reﬂect on the
dynamic eﬀects of the determinants of entrepreneurial activities. We sum them up in the
following paragraphs, before discussing potential indirect eﬀects and reﬂecting on policy
implications for a sustainable reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Household related features explain the probability of holding a business to a quite
limited extent. Many of the features replicate the evidence found in the standard literature
on entrepreneurship, but there are also quite a few Afghan speciﬁc eﬀects. Among these,
by far the strongest positive eﬀect on the probability of being an entrepreneur (at the
mean value of the variable) is exerted by the number of activities in which the household
is involved, followed by the household size: it is much easier to hold a business when the
risk of incurring income losses is covered by the involvement in a large number of other
activities. In other terms, the high instability constraints the set of households choices,
allowing only those households that can diversify among income sources to invest in a small
business. How much this is an indirect eﬀect of conﬂict can be assessed by comparing those
results with similar analysis in diﬀerent developing and developed contexts.
The fact that entrepreneurship is mainly a coping strategy is conﬁrmed also by the
negative eﬀect of external funds, all migration variables, and especially receiving remit-
tances. In general, access to resources is not related to entrepreneurial activity. Even if
entrepreneurs use more loans for business investment, they access loans less than non-
entrepreneurs, and not through formal credit institutions, indicating risk-averse entrepre-
neurship due, perhaps, to uncertainty related to conﬂict.
A similar result applies to social capital, which does not play a big role in favouring
entrepreneurship in a country that has seen conﬂict for an entire generation. In fact,
when considering ﬁnancial and social capital, none of them seem to be an indirect channel
through which the intensity of conﬂict across districts plays a role, but this is likely to
depend on the static feature of our analysis.
We do ﬁnd some evidence of rent-seeking and regulatory capture, but they do have
a very small eﬀect in predicting entrepreneurial activity, such as any other institutional
variable. An indirect cost of conﬂict is also shown by the displacement of households. Their
25return has a negative impact on entrepreneurial activity, when it does create tensions in
the local community.
Finally, signiﬁcant eﬀects of ongoing conﬂict on entrepreneurship appear to operate
through the inadequate access to markets and lack of adequate infrastructure to support
business activity. Arguably, these two factors are products of ongoing conﬂict and hence
conﬂict has a signiﬁcant but indirect eﬀect on entrepreneurship over time. At a mini-
mum, continued inadequacy of access to markets and infrastructure is likely to prevent
the process of expansion and moving up on value chains as a key aspect of the evolu-
tion process that characterizes most productive entrepreneurial activities. The non-linear
relation between trade infrastructure and likelihood of entrepreneurship reinforce the hy-
pothesis of the survival non-productive entrepreneurialism: without any access to markets,
communities rely on autarchic production.
We now turn to discussing the mixed evidences and theoretical implications of the
existing literature on conﬂict and entrepreneurship, together with the policy implications
that emerges on the debated Afghan “reconstruction”. Certainly, continued conﬂict has
generated strong incentive dynamics for non-productive and destructive entrepreneurship
in Afghanistan. Numerous warlords and people of inﬂuence have beneﬁted handsomely
from the conﬂict through being the Jehadi facilitators assisting the CIA in its covert, and
later overt, anti-Soviet campaign and later as moneyed strong persons who continued to
exert their inﬂuence and do thriving business by getting involved in the many physical
reconstruction projects that require local counterparts and contractors to be implemented.
Corruption and nepotism are rife in all manner of aid contracting in Afghanistan. With the
massive amounts of international aid money that has continued to pour into the country,
ﬁrst during the Cold War and recently as part of the reconstruction programme, amassing
money is very likely to take precedence over undertaking productive business activity.
What can we infer from the empirical evidence to identify entry points for intervention
through reconstruction and other donor programmes? This, perhaps, is the proverbial
million-dollar question in the context of Afghanistan. As a formal nation state Afghanistan
has a history of just over 200 years. As we point out, the country was created as a buﬀer
state in an unruly area between two major powers, Britain and Russia, with territorial
ambitions in Central and South Asia. Like many countries in the region, the borders
of what constitutes Afghanistan are mere lines arbitrarily dividing ancient communities
and forcing together unlikely neighbours. That neither of the two regional powers ever
succeeded in keeping a foothold in the country has been often attributed to the ﬁerceness
of Afghans in guerilla warfare against all invaders and this apparent resilience of Afghans
in ﬁghting oﬀ conquest over prolonged periods of time by any power. While there has been
ﬁerceness and resilience, it is also true that much of the country has never been under
consistent endogenous rule from above at a national level. Afghanistan has never fully
developed the structures and institutions through which a nation can be governed and
that deﬁnes a relatively coherent whole. Ruling Afghanistan has always been arduous and
tenuous, even by endogenous movements and actors.
26Reconstruction through development aid programmes and projects in the context just
described is at best diﬃcult. For reconstruction policy to meet its objectives, the imple-
mentation parameters have to be known and be of relative permanency. A major problem
with development aid supported policies in Afghanistan is that they are based on mental
models imported from elsewhere (with at least semi-deﬁnable governing institutions of
a modern state) without much apparent attempt to adapt them to the local conditions.
An example of this is the many faceted market-based approach in the post-2002 period
to deliver services and to rebuild the industrial base. Numerous experts working for the
international donor agencies in Afghanistan refer to “the Afghan people” and the positive
role to be played by the private sector as if these were clearly identiﬁable cohesive wholes.
Privatization of state-owned industries soon after the fall of the Taliban, as a donor-driven
reconstruction policy to nurture the entrepreneurial spirit in the private sector, resulted
in selling oﬀ numerous state assets at ﬁre sale prices to the already powerful without
generating new value adding economic activity (Paterson et al., 2006).
Afghanistan has numerous unresolved conﬂicts along ethnic lines and faces many
challenges in reconstructing its economy, not least because of extreme poverty, resource
scarcity, and a lack of adequate structures to support productive entrepreneurial activity.
That this is the case does not and should not mean that intervention to reconstruct the
country is ill advised or hopeless. As we have shown in our analysis, the entrepreneurial
activity is largely unfazed by the ongoing conﬂict. Building on this entrepreneurial spirit
requires careful and clear assessment of the entrepreneurs’ needs, trajectories, and am-
bitions. While the information collected through NRVA surveys is useful in providing
a picture of how things have unfolded in the socio-economy, they are insuﬃcient as the
basis on which to develop intervention strategies to introduce change aimed at supporting
productive entrepreneurship. Demand assessment in labour, raw material, and product
markets can provide valuable information on how development aid can bolster the ability
of suppliers to meet the demands.
Given the diﬃcult conditions for conducting complementary population surveys on
speciﬁc aspects of households’ behavior, the diﬃculty of making survey data available in
a timely manner,40 and the high probability of rapid data obsolescence due to chronic
conﬂict, our analysis is inconclusive. Because of these constraints, a further conclusion
we make is that more attention needs to be paid to narrative-based case studies of en-
trepreneurial activity to contextualize and accompany formal analyses based survey data
such as we have attempted to do in this paper. The value of intuition based on narratives
collected through case studies in territorially bounded study areas or on speciﬁc issues of
interest cannot be underestimated or dismissed because of imprecision in contexts such as
Afghanistan. If we want to know how entrepreneurs cope and whether they are produc-
tive, non-productive, or destructive in conﬂict situations, we need to ask entrepreneurs
40The 2007-8 NRVA dataset remains unavailable at the time of writing. In addition, there is little
congruence between the datasets from 2003 and 2005 due the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the survey
questions.
27involved in economic activity in our areas of interest. In other words, it is at best diﬃ-
cult to generalize on cases like Afghanistan because it is diverse, fragmented, and ﬂuid.
Future research will need to draw on the available quantitative databases—as we have
attempted to do in this paper—and on locally speciﬁc case studies of selected segments of
the economy for more depth to inform intervention decision making.
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34A Data preparation
A.1 Missing observations and ﬁnal sample
Dependent variable
Once we drop the Kuchi population from the sample, there are 979 missing observations
for the deﬁnition of Entrepreneur (EntrBus), 3.9 percent. Although this is not a large
number, we check the pattern of the missing values. Figure 2 shows that most of the
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Figure 2: Distribution of missing responses on the sources of income (deﬁnition of en-
trepreneur) across strata. strata 1 to 34 represent rural observations across the 24 provinces;
strata 35 to 44 represent the urban observations across provinces that have large towns.
We then check whether there are diﬀerences in the mean value of the dependent vari-
ables, between missing and non (with the exception of the variables that have coincident
missing values).
Survey: Mean estimation
Number of strata = 44 Number of obs = 25075
Number of PSUs = 2385 Population size = 3196248
Design df = 2341
0: nomissDep = 0
1: nomissDep = 1
35Linearized
Over Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
ShockInsec05
0 .4225518 .0280291 .3675873 .4775163
1 .4209183 .0088773 .4035101 .4383265
ShockInsec1
0 .0141439 .0081112 -.001762 .0300498
1 .0244982 .0037495 .0171455 .0318509
Priority_Disarm
0 .061967 .0138068 .0348921 .0890418
1 .0630778 .0052144 .0528524 .0733032
Literacy
0 .2530773 .0209672 .2119611 .2941936
1 .2132347 .0039684 .2054528 .2210166
Priority_Edu
0 .5705583 .0312029 .5093702 .6317465
1 .6477082 .0100597 .6279814 .6674351
HHMemb5
0 .2282205 .0209606 .1871172 .2693238
1 .2243344 .0036146 .2172463 .2314225
HHMemb10
0 .6301867 .0228583 .585362 .6750113
1 .6370683 .0040006 .6292232 .6449135
HHMemb15
0 .1024661 .0138509 .0753048 .1296273
1 .1026453 .002575 .0975958 .1076948
HHMemb22
0 .0266493 .0072319 .0124676 .040831
1 .0184445 .0016282 .0152516 .0216373
Age
0 3.023896 .018523 2.987573 3.060219
1 3.023788 .0032657 3.017383 3.030192
Activities
0 (dropped)
1 .263769 .0019303 .2599838 .2675542
Urban
0 .2425745 .0217749 .1998744 .2852745
1 .1664911 .0015467 .1634581 .1695241
Assets
0 1.683651 .0218742 1.640756 1.726545
1 1.695264 .0050864 1.68529 1.705238
Credit_Inform
0 .7618367 .0209291 .7207952 .8028783
1 .7717751 .0048136 .7623358 .7812145
Credit_Lender
0 .1546304 .0169083 .1214735 .1877872
1 .1326884 .0037857 .1252647 .1401122
36Credit_Bank
0 .0059656 .0031311 -.0001745 .0121057
1 .0029125 .0004226 .0020837 .0037413
Credit_Other
0 .0040611 .0024702 -.0007829 .0089051
1 .0081025 .0007723 .006588 .009617
Loan
0 .3996275 .025011 .3505814 .4486736
1 .3858941 .0058109 .3744991 .3972892
LoanInvest
0 .0162725 .0053453 .0057905 .0267545
1 .0145537 .0009424 .0127056 .0164018
Priority_Credit
0 .0163985 .0056373 .0053438 .0274532
1 .0359375 .0037507 .0285825 .0432926
InfoForm
0 .1186125 .0158794 .0874734 .1497516
1 .1056358 .0033671 .0990331 .1122386
InfoInfor
0 .434259 .0284612 .3784471 .4900709
1 .4779097 .0076119 .4629829 .4928366
InfoBus
0 .0236385 .0068796 .0101478 .0371292
1 .0147323 .0010128 .0127462 .0167183
HelpFriends
0 .6828411 .0681843 .5491333 .8165489
1 .9577857 .0287357 .9014355 1.014136
MemberGov
0 .2114299 .0215759 .1691202 .2537397
1 .2127466 .0052164 .2025174 .2229759
Decisions
0 3.228172 .2274192 2.782207 3.674136
1 3.441026 .0485955 3.345732 3.536321
ShockReturn
0 .0091578 .0008958 .0074011 .0109145
1 .006335 .000219 .0059057 .0067644
Returnees
0 2.659879 .1229623 2.418753 2.901006
1 2.312416 .0312792 2.251078 2.373754
Returnees_Go
0 .9815238 .0851316 .8145826 1.148465
1 .7409977 .0256323 .6907333 .7912622
MktClose
0 .5012954 .0301582 .4421558 .5604349
1 .4931172 .0096438 .474206 .5120285
ElectrPub
370 .1712949 .019518 .1330205 .2095694
1 .1501281 .0049052 .1405091 .1597471
ElectrPriv
0 .0444342 .0098503 .0251179 .0637504
1 .0347151 .0023041 .0301968 .0392334
ElectrComm
0 .036326 .009724 .0172573 .0553946
1 .0535647 .0036867 .0463352 .0607942
RoadKm
0 .8297074 .0734572 .6856595 .9737554
1 .8177741 .0195281 .77948 .8560682
Note: variances scaled within each stage to handle strata with
a single sampling unit.
The results are quite contradictory. Non-respondents live in slightly more secure areas,
with better access to education, have a higher literacy rate, and slightly less assets. The
area features, together with the signiﬁcantly large proportion of urban households are due
the large concentration of non-response in Kabul. In terms of access to resources, there
is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the loan access, although non-respondents are more likely
to access credit via formal institutions (again a Kabul eﬀect) but leave in areas with a
higher priority for credit markets. There is some diﬀerence in terms of migration rate, with
non-respondents having a quite lower number of migrants.41 In terms of social capital,
non-respondents are more likely to rely on formal information sources and less keen in
helping friends. Concerning the institutional environment, non-respondents leave in areas
with a slightly larger number of returnees, and slightly lower participation of governing
bodies. Finally, non-respondents leave in areas with slightly better infrastructure, which
is again a Kabul eﬀect.
Overall, a comparison of the mean diﬀerences in the dependent variables between
respondents and non-respondents do not allow to deﬁne any particular pattern. These
ﬁgures allow us to exclude any bias in the reported analysis due to missing values in the
dependent variable.
We test if there is any diﬀerence in the income, corrected by equivalence scales, and
non-respondents report only a slightly lower income. This ﬁgure should be taken with
a lot of caution, as the income data for the NRVA 2005 is quite unreliable (MRRD and
CSO, 2007). Rather, we compute the ratio of households reporting an income higher
than 0: among the non-respondents only 39 percent report a positive income, while for
respondents the ﬁgure increases to 71 percent. This might suggest that non-respondents
are not able to indicate a source of income.
To sum up, with respect to the entrepreneurship variable, we do not ﬁnd any evident
source of bias in the missing response, or at most is related to wealth (e.g. it might
that data is missing because the household had no source of income in that year). Given
that this paper is not concerned with any wealth implication, this would not represent a
41Results available from the authors.
38problem for the analysis.
Independent variables
Given the large size of the sample, we avoid data imputation, as most variables are quite
hard to impute without introducing a lot of noise: the community or district level in-
formation should not diﬀer between households of the same community/districts (which
with would happen with both simple, multiple or hotdeck, imputation using households
information). Second, many of he remaining variables are either subjective evaluations
(like experiencing a shock) or related to environmental conditions (like access to credit).
Missing observations do not alter signiﬁcantly the distribution of observations across
strata (Figure 2 in Appendix A), a part from a 1 percent point reduction in the Kabul
population. More importantly, the missing observations in the diﬀerent groups of explana-
tory variables (including households and resources, and environmental determinants) are
not related to the intensity of the conﬂict. It is not the risky environment that hampers
the collection of data, or inﬂuences the propensity of the household to answer given ques-
tions. In Figure 3 we compare the original sample distribution across strata (without the
Kuchi) and the sample distribution when the observations with missing values in both
the dependent and the independent variables are dropped. This shows that the original
representation holds, although in Kabul the sample is reduced by one percentage point.
In order to make sure that we are not missing observations exactly because of the
high intensity of the conﬂict, which may hamper the survey procedures, or households
and Shura willingness to respond to certain aspects of the questionnaire, we analyse the
correlation between the conﬂict indicators and the observations with missing variables, for
the diﬀerent groups of variables (household, access to resources, social capital, institutions,
and infrastructure) in Table 4: correlations are very weak, and positive coeﬃcients, indi-
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Figure 3: Distribution of the sample across strata with and without missing values in both
dependent and independent variables. strata 1 to 34 represent rural observations across
the 24 provinces; strata 35 to 44 represent the urban observations across provinces that
have large towns. Full bars show the distribution of the original sample, while the black











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































41We also check if the mean of the conﬂict variables diﬀer for missing values in the
infrastructure variables, to control for a bias due to failure in capturing information in
the most troublesome villages/districts. The opposite actually turns out to be the case:
missing values of the environmental variables that refer to infrastructure are more concen-
trated in districts with lower values of the conﬂict indicators: information is not missing
because of the diﬃcult war conditions.42 The same applies to missing values in the other
environmental variables: social capital and resources.
B Robustness checks
B.1 Model speciﬁcation
For each set of variables (household features, access to resources, social capital, formal
institutions, and infrastructure) we have chosen the speciﬁcation with
• no problems of multicollinearity,
• better goodness of ﬁt measures,
• better prediction when comparing actual and predicted value of Y ,
• comparatively lower mean or residuals (using the generalized residuals as computed
in Gourieroux et al. (1987)),
• for which variables were signiﬁcant at least under some of the speciﬁcations (i.e.
deleting removing tat were robustly non-signiﬁcant),
• lower number of missing observations.
Among the diﬀerent comparisons for all for all continuous and count data we have
tested the signiﬁcance of squared terms, as well as of diﬀerent categorical transformations.
When two speciﬁcations were highly comparable (had very similar ﬁt) we have tested
them both when subsequently adding variable sets, and always found equivalent results.
This was the case, for example, for the continuous values of household size, and the amount
of the loan.
B.2 Missing values
In order to conﬁrm the lack of bias of missing values on the ﬁnal results, we have compared
the estimation for each set of variables with all available observations, with the estimations
obtained dropping observations for which values are missing for the new added variables.
For example, the ﬁrst speciﬁcation controlling only for the households features (column
1 in Table 6) has been analyzed with 27973 observations and the 24496 observations
available when all variables sets are estimated (and all intermediate sample sizes). Results
are highly robust to those sample variations, as shown in Table 5.
42Results not presented for reasons of limited space, are available from the authors.
42Table 5: CLogLog marginal eﬀects: comparing HH features with diﬀer-
ent sample sizes
HH Res SC Inst Infr
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShockInsec05 -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ShockInsec1 -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.042***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Priority Disarm 0.029** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.042***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
MenOnly 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Literacy 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Priority Edu -0.009** -0.009** -0.010** -0.010** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HHMemb5 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.061***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
HHMemb10 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
HHMemb15 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.108***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
HHMemb22 0.123** 0.118** 0.116** 0.116** 0.109**
(0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Age 0.023 0.029 0.022 0.022 0.010
(0.050) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.050)
Age2 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
SocialContr -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Activities 0.202*** 0.205*** 0.208*** 0.209*** 0.203***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Activities -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.076**
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Urban 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Assets 0.054*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.105***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Assets2 -0.014** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.028***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 27973 26045 25447 25436 24496
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
43B.3 Outliers
We check for outliers across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, by analysing the residuals. None of
the speciﬁcations has severe outliers, but we do check for results when we drop observations
with residuals that are clearly distant from the bulk. We do so for observations that appear
as outliers across most sets of variables and models (Probit Logit and CLogLog), as well
as for observations that are considered outliers only in two diﬀerent regressions. In none
of the cases those more extreme observations have any inﬂuence on the results.
For all variable sets we also check for the interquantile range of continuous variables,
and mark as outliers those observation that have a value which is three interquantile ranges
away from the closer quartile. All those observations have a residual which is inside the
bulk of the residuals’ distribution. We then assume all those observations provide useful
information for the sake of the analysis.
B.4 Model ﬁtness
Overall, all speciﬁcations show a quite good ﬁt, although the explanatory power, measured
with the McFadden R2, is quite standard but not particularly high, even when all sets
of variables are used (Table 3). Indeed, it is clear that all sets of variables add some
more information on the likelihood that a household has a small business, as suggested by
an increasing R2, and a strongly improving information criterion along speciﬁcations.43
An analysis of the survey design eﬀect (DEFF) also shows that the study is quite well
designed.44
The relevance of each set of variables in predicting the probability that a household
has a small business can be assessed by comparing the predicted outcome with the actual
status of each observation. We do so with a non-parametric locally weighted regression
(LOWESS): Figure 4 shows results for both a local weighting and a kernel weighting
polynomial. Given the very low number of positive outputs (entrepreneurs) the ﬁgure
should be taken with caution when assessing the prediction power of the speciﬁcations,
but it is interesting to compare them.
The regression shows that, apart from the infrastructure variables, all variable sets
tend to over-predict the entrepreneurial outcome, with respect to the actual observations:
entrepreneurs are actually less than the used variables would make infer. The inclusion
of diﬀerent variable sets mitigates this problem, especially with respect to institutions
and social capital variables. Interestingly, though, formal institutions reduce the ratio of
predicted entrepreneurs, as if the small negative impact we ﬁnd was already overstated. On
the contrary, infrastructure variables seem to overshoot, by allowing to predict a smaller
number of entrepreneurs than actually observed (a). Indeed, when we look at the more
ﬂexible polynomial relation (b) we do ﬁnd that the inclusion of infrastructure allows to
have the best ﬁt between the predicted probability and the ratio of actual entrepreneurs.
43A comparison of an adjusted R2 gives the same result.
44All DEFF measures are below 3, a part from one province dummy, with most value very close to 1.
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(a) Locally weighted smoothing (b) Kernel weighted polynomial smoothing
Figure 4: Relation between predicted probability and actual status of each observation for
the diﬀerent sets of variables. (a) shows a locally weighted scatter plot smoothing, and
(b) a kernel weighted polynomial smoothing.
45C Tables
Table 6: CLogLog regressions coeﬃcients: comparing sets
HH Res SC Inst Infr
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShockInsec05 -0.368*** -0.361*** -0.327*** -0.288*** -0.264***
(0.0762) (0.0759) (0.0755) (0.0765) (0.0770)
ShockInsec1 -0.925** -0.938** -0.903** -0.870** -0.890**
(0.364) (0.367) (0.363) (0.370) (0.374)
Priority Disarm 0.513*** 0.472*** 0.455*** 0.466*** 0.380***























Returnees Go -0.0588** -0.0538**
(0.0246) (0.0239)
InfoForm -0.198** -0.188* -0.158
(0.0991) (0.0984) (0.0972)
InfoInfor 0.0750 0.0596 0.0895
(0.0661) (0.0655) (0.0657)
InfoBus 0.623*** 0.581*** 0.634***
(0.155) (0.154) (0.155)
HelpFriends -0.0348* -0.0330* -0.0289
(0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0192)
Credit Inform 0.332*** 0.352*** 0.363*** 0.342***
(0.0919) (0.0914) (0.0924) (0.0909)
Credit Lender 0.136 0.167 0.185 0.178
(0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
Credit Bank -0.296 -0.282 -0.287 -0.285
Continued on next page...
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(0.442) (0.442) (0.443) (0.443)
Credit Other 0.0109 0.00987 -0.0189 0.0163
(0.288) (0.289) (0.292) (0.290)
Loan -0.391*** -0.376*** -0.353*** -0.329***
(0.0670) (0.0668) (0.0664) (0.0660)
LoanInvest 1.036*** 1.012*** 0.984*** 0.961***
(0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132)
Priority Credit -0.123 -0.122 -0.115 -0.119
(0.164) (0.164) (0.161) (0.159)
RemitContr -0.642*** -0.630*** -0.635*** -0.614***
(0.158) (0.157) (0.158) (0.157)
MenOnly 0.767*** 0.810*** 0.804*** 0.798*** 0.784***
(0.121) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124)
Literacy 0.188*** 0.180*** 0.184*** 0.152** 0.121**
(0.0596) (0.0595) (0.0593) (0.0600) (0.0590)
Priority Edu -0.138** -0.128** -0.115* -0.115* -0.112*
(0.0631) (0.0626) (0.0623) (0.0620) (0.0615)
HHMemb5 0.750*** 0.790*** 0.807*** 0.846*** 0.872***
(0.208) (0.207) (0.207) (0.208) (0.208)
HHMemb10 0.976*** 1.044*** 1.066*** 1.114*** 1.169***
(0.219) (0.219) (0.219) (0.219) (0.220)
HHMemb15 1.071*** 1.177*** 1.207*** 1.249*** 1.290***
(0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.238) (0.239)
HHMemb22 1.021*** 1.166*** 1.204*** 1.236*** 1.252***
(0.332) (0.332) (0.332) (0.335) (0.335)
Age 0.144 0.166 0.0923 0.0250 0.184
(0.754) (0.774) (0.734) (0.670) (0.748)
Age2 -0.0587 -0.0537 -0.0417 -0.0340 -0.0576
(0.126) (0.129) (0.123) (0.113) (0.125)
SocialContr -0.749** -0.767** -0.734** -0.764** -0.747**
(0.303) (0.302) (0.304) (0.306) (0.311)
Activities 3.056*** 3.185*** 3.221*** 3.340*** 3.471***
(0.471) (0.490) (0.496) (0.499) (0.512)
Activities -1.135*** -1.258*** -1.263*** -1.310*** -1.417***
(0.439) (0.467) (0.477) (0.477) (0.499)
Urban 0.814*** 0.762*** 0.750*** 0.774*** 0.516***
(0.0896) (0.0906) (0.0908) (0.0900) (0.111)
Assets 1.571*** 1.518*** 1.498*** 1.333*** 1.339***
(0.423) (0.422) (0.423) (0.407) (0.413)
Assets2 -0.420*** -0.427*** -0.418*** -0.365*** -0.390***
(0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.119) (0.122)
Kapisa -0.768** -0.618 -0.599 -0.531 -0.426
(0.388) (0.389) (0.387) (0.397) (0.404)
Parwan 0.479* 0.503* 0.511* 0.463 0.452
(0.283) (0.282) (0.283) (0.296) (0.301)
Wardak 0.655*** 0.762*** 0.827*** 0.846*** 0.913***
(0.246) (0.251) (0.249) (0.268) (0.270)
Logar 0.218 0.283 0.316 0.347 0.236
(0.311) (0.307) (0.306) (0.320) (0.316)
Continued on next page...
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Ghazni -0.303 -0.170 -0.152 -0.196 -0.271
(0.213) (0.214) (0.214) (0.221) (0.220)
Paktika -0.872* -0.832 -0.862* -0.942* -0.879*
(0.514) (0.517) (0.517) (0.527) (0.523)
Paktya -0.134 0.0188 -0.00918 -0.0517 0.0614
(0.287) (0.303) (0.305) (0.301) (0.316)
Khost 0.0579 0.171 0.158 0.221 0.280
(0.265) (0.263) (0.265) (0.286) (0.285)
Nangarhar 0.0783 0.111 0.135 0.0708 0.0722
(0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.175) (0.171)
Kunarha 0.379 0.445* 0.470** 0.485** 0.398
(0.243) (0.246) (0.238) (0.245) (0.251)
Laghman -0.376 -0.445 -0.485 -0.543 -0.433
(0.430) (0.423) (0.423) (0.435) (0.431)
Nuristan -1.989** -1.837** -1.798** -1.664** -2.039**
(0.775) (0.776) (0.776) (0.797) (0.833)
Badakhshan 0.899*** 0.907*** 0.944*** 0.944*** 0.940***
(0.204) (0.202) (0.201) (0.215) (0.197)
Takhar 0.696*** 0.694*** 0.695*** 0.597*** 0.705***
(0.161) (0.161) (0.162) (0.183) (0.186)
Baghlan 0.969*** 0.941*** 0.973*** 0.843*** 0.880***
(0.149) (0.146) (0.146) (0.167) (0.168)
Kunduz -0.194 -0.222 -0.151 -0.386** -0.334*
(0.171) (0.174) (0.176) (0.196) (0.194)
Samangan -0.148 -0.0227 0.00912 -0.0532 -0.132
(0.438) (0.434) (0.431) (0.453) (0.471)
Balkh -0.0581 -0.0617 -0.0404 -0.0853 -0.0972
(0.147) (0.147) (0.146) (0.170) (0.170)
Jawzjan 0.767*** 0.850*** 0.862*** 0.802*** 0.795***
(0.179) (0.176) (0.180) (0.200) (0.198)
Sar i Poul 0.178 0.310 0.452** 0.550*** 0.645***
(0.189) (0.192) (0.196) (0.212) (0.218)
Faryab 0.312** 0.304* 0.348** 0.220 0.280
(0.153) (0.156) (0.157) (0.171) (0.171)
Badghis -1.344*** -1.282*** -1.219*** -1.225*** -1.163***
(0.389) (0.393) (0.390) (0.397) (0.402)
Hirat 0.139 0.222 0.224 0.129 0.134
(0.143) (0.143) (0.145) (0.162) (0.161)
Nimroz 0.855*** 0.812*** 0.799*** 0.708*** 0.662***
(0.237) (0.232) (0.234) (0.242) (0.232)
Farah 0.597*** 0.533*** 0.528*** 0.502** 0.432*
(0.206) (0.201) (0.203) (0.214) (0.231)
Hilmand 0.274 0.201 0.212 0.270 0.301
(0.218) (0.220) (0.218) (0.236) (0.237)
Kandahar 0.580*** 0.576*** 0.591*** 0.820*** 0.743***
(0.156) (0.155) (0.154) (0.164) (0.165)
Zabul 0.891*** 0.741** 0.681** 0.726** 0.949***
(0.305) (0.310) (0.303) (0.325) (0.331)
Uruzgan -0.696** -0.593* -0.620* -0.610* -0.563
Continued on next page...
48... Table 6 continued
(0.348) (0.359) (0.359) (0.371) (0.374)
Ghor -0.370 -0.220 -0.179 -0.261 -0.0921
(0.245) (0.247) (0.245) (0.254) (0.258)
Bamyan -1.008** -0.809** -0.812** -0.885** -0.819**
(0.402) (0.403) (0.402) (0.409) (0.410)
PanjSher 0.144 0.116 0.143 0.137 0.124
(0.244) (0.247) (0.249) (0.261) (0.256)
Daikindi -1.629*** -1.389** -1.376** -1.527** -1.473**
(0.604) (0.600) (0.600) (0.605) (0.610)
Constant -6.217*** -6.504*** -6.470*** -6.225*** -6.672***
(1.206) (1.238) (1.178) (1.083) (1.200)
Observations 24496 24496 24496 24496 24496
Standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 5: Distribution of the primary sources of income for diﬀerent populations. On the
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Figure 7: Relation between local conﬂict intensity and entrepreneurship: Quantile regres-
sions with selected variables. The regression includes all variables in ﬁgure: we have dropped
conﬂict indicators with too large correlation, and those from BN source, which have a too small
sample. The grey continuous series represent the change in the quantile coeﬃcients, and the grey
area its CI; the dashed series represent the OLS regression coeﬃcient, and the dotted lines its CI.
————————
Source: see Table 1.
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